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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRISTENSEN DIAMOND PRODUCTS, 
A Corporation, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
THERON S. COVEY, et al, 
Appellam,ts. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No. 8039 
' , .~:. ,-~ J 
Respondents filed an action to recover the reason-
able value of diamond drill bits furnished for the drilling 
of an oil well in lTintah County, lT tah. The action was 
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filed against a large number of Defendants, including 
M. E. l3aird and H. L. Robbins who were active in the 
drilling of the well, a number of defendants who had 
pun·ha~ed eertifieateH of interest in the well as referred 
to at 1{. 81, and which certificates did not require the 
drilling of a well, as well aH the Appellants who refused 
to purcha~e such eertificates in that form (see un-num-
bered Exhibit entitled "(;ertificate of Ownership of 
Interest in Oil and Gas Lease") but prepared instead 
a ~o-called joint operating agreement (Exhibit C) which 
\vill be further described. 
l~espondents recovered judg1nent in the sum of $1,-
7:~j.9G ( R. 17) against those defendants who had executed 
the joint operating agreement and judgment of no cause 
of action \Vas entered as to all other defendants. The 
defendants Baird and Robbins have not appealed. 
The Court found that Appellants and Baird and 
Robbins were 1nining partners under the joint operating 
agreen1ent and were jointly responsible for all of the 
debts of the nuning partnership. 
By stipulation of the parties (R. 21 and 22) it is 
provided that the record in the case of Mud Control 
Laboratories, Inc., a corporation, vs. Theron 8. Covey, 
et al, which is case No. 8025 in this court and which was 
consolidated with this case for trial in the court below 
(R. 81) could be used as the record- in this case, insofar 
as the transcript of testimony is concerned. All refer-
ences herein higher than page 25 of the record 'vill be 
refer ences to the record in No. 802'5. Where such refer-
ences are to pages other than portions of the tran-
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~rribed testiinony such \vill be indicated. The Exhibits 
were introduced "·ithout referenee to either case and 
reference to exhibits herein \Yill be to the exhibits in No. 
S0~5. The Court found that Appellants and l\l. E. Baird 
and H. L. R.obbins entered into a written contract en-
titled Joint Operating ... \gree1nent (Exhibit C) for the 
purpose of developing a leasehold and that in accordance 
\vith said agreen1ent a \vell known as the Slaugh N·o. 1 
\V" ell "-as drilled on the property described in Finding 
Xo.l (R. 13 and 14). The Court also found: 
·~5. That at all ti1nes hereinabove mentioned the 
defendants, _jl. E. Baird and H. L. Robbins, carried on 
business as c·o-partners under the fir1n na1ue and style 
of "'Baird & Robbins Drilling Con1pany"; that in said 
partnership capacity the said M. E. Baird and II. L. 
Robbins, jointly with the Coveys, conducted the· opera-
tion and drilling of the well on the above-described prop-
erty. 
6. That by the ter1ns of the aforesaid "'Joint Oper-
ating Agree1nent" the said l\1. E. Baird and H. L. Rob-
bins, a partnership, vvere authorized alternately to ein-
ploy individuals for the actual drilling and operation of 
the vvell or to e1nploy the services of a l'Orporation to 
be w·holly owned by the said M. E. Baird and H. L. Rob-
bins; that on or about December 26, 1948, the said 1\tf. E. 
Baird and H. L. Robbins did, in fact, organize and forn1 
a Utah corp·oration wholly owned by the said 1\f. E. Baird 
and H. L. Robbins, having the corporate name of "Baird 
& Robbins Drilling Cornpany, Inc."; that thereafter the 
:-;nid 1\l. FJ. Baird and H. L,j. Robbins intermingled the 
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4 
fund8 and aHHetH of the aforesaid partnership and of the 
afo rPsaid corporation and generally c·onducted the busi-
IH~HH affairs of the said partnership and of the said cor-
poration, particularly \vith regard to the drilling of the 
af'ore~aid well, without regard to the individual capacity 
or ~Pparateness of the said partnership and corporation, 
to tllP extent that the said Haird & Robbins Drilling Com-
pany, Inc., had no separate or independent activity, func-
tion, or existence in the drilling of the aforesaid well or 
the developruent of the afore~aid property. 
10. That in selling and delivering the aforesaid 
dia1nond drill bits to the said 1\tf. E. Baird and H. L. 
Robbins the plaintiff, (~hristensen Dia1nond Products 
l~o1npany did not rely upon the separate and independent 
credit of the defendants Covey" (R. 14 and 15). 
The joint operating agree1nent is Exhibit C, and 
contains the following provisions deemed material on 
the question whether a 1nining partnership existed be-
tween Baird and Robbins, or their partnership, or their 
corporation and the Appellants. 
'"THIS AGREEMENT, entered into this 5th 
day of January, 1949, by and between M. E. Baird 
and H. L. Robbins, a partnership, with their prin-
cipal place of business in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
and Sybil T. Baird, wife of M. E. Baird, first par-
ties, hereinafter called 'operator,' and S.M. Covey, 
A. A. Covey, H. T. Covey, S. G. Covey, T. S. 
Covey and F. K. Gilroy, hereinafter called 'Cov-
eys,' second parties, hereinafter collectively called 
'non-operators.' 
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I. (-.ONSIDER.L~TION 
.A... Non-operator~ agree to pay first par-
tie~ the 8Ulll of Sixteen Thousand 
Dollars ( $16,000.00) as follows: Eight 
Thousand Dollars ( $8,000.00) concur-
rently \Yith the following and Eight 
'rhousand Dollars ($8,000.00) upon 
the connnencernen t of the drilling 
of the first well as described in para-
graph I\:"" herein : 
C. Non-operators further agree to pur-
chase pipe of a description hereafter 
to be agreed upon by the parties at a 
cost of not to exceed Seven Thousand, 
Five Hundred Dollars ($7,500.00), 
vvhich pipe shall be owned by Coveys 
and available subject to the conditions 
hereinafter set forth. Coveys agree to 
deliver their checks, payable to owner 
and seller of said pipe, from whom op-
erator agrees to obtain bill of sale to 
said pipe, in fayor of the second par-
ties. 
II. EF·F-ECTIVE PERIOD 
This agreernent is to rernain in force 
for the full term of any and all of the 
leases or agreernents as heretofore de-
scribed and of any renewals or exten-
sions thereof, whether by production 
or otherwise. It i:-3 expressly under-
stood and agreed bet-\\Teen the parties 
hereto that by these presents the first 
parties haYe tran~ferred to the Second 
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parties twelve per cent ( 12o/o) of the 
one hundred per cent ( 100%) interest. 
Ill. POS'SESSION OF OPERATOR 
"\. (Jperator shall have the sole right of 
prospecting and e~ploring the lands, 
subject to this agreement, and drilling 
for, producing, storing, transporting 
and retnoving oil, gas and other hy-
dro-carbon substances from the lands, 
~ubject to this agreement, together 
\vith the right, subject to the terms 
of the several leases herein described, 
to establish, maintain and repair on 
the lands or to remove therefron1. 
tanks, boilers, buildings, machinery 
and other apparatus or equipment, 
pipe lines, pole lines, power lines, tele-
phone and telegraph lines, rods and 
other appurtenances which 1nay be 
necessary or convenient in the produc-
tion, treat1nent, storage or transporta-
tion of oil, gas or other hydro-carbon 
substances on or from the lands as 
1nay be necessary for the purposes of 
operating and carrying out the terms, 
provisions and purposes of this agree-
ment. 
B. The nu1nber of employees, the selec-
tion of such employees, the hours of 
labor and compensation for services 
to be paid any and all such employees 
shall be solely at the discretion and 
determination of the operator and 
such employees shall be the employees 
of the operator and under its sole di-
rection and orders. 
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..:\. Operator agrees to drill a well on the 
land described in paragraph 1 of 'De-
~eri ptions: and at a location on said 
land determined by the operator and 
to eouunence the drilling of said well 
on or before the first day of February, 
1949. The Sixteen Thousand Dollars 
($16,000.00) hereinbefore na1ned and 
paid to the first parties sha1l be used 
by the operator for payment of drill-
ing and development charges in con-
nection with the drilling of said well 
and no part of any.costs or expenses 
for the drilling of said well or the 
maintenance of this lease, such as the 
payment of Two Thousand Dollars 
($2,000.00) as rental charge (should. 
the payment be necessary to continue 
said lease in full force and effect) shall 
be charged or be a claim upon the 
second parties. In the event said well 
shall he a dry hole, no costs, including 
costs of abandonment shall be a clain1 
against second parties. If said vvell 
produces oil or gas in commercial 
quantities, all of the development costs 
· and expenses, including, but not limit-
ed to, drilling, casing, tubing, rods, 
pumping equip1nent, well head connec-
tions, separators and tanks, incurred 
by operator in connection with the 
drilling and equip1nent of said well for 
production, shall be borne and paid 
for exclusively by operator. 
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It () perator shall conduct its operation 
in a good and workmanlike manner 
and in accordance with good oil field 
prtH·tice. If operator so desires it may 
(~lnploy its own tools and equipment 
in the drilling of said well or it may 
entploy the services of a corporation 
wholly owned hy operator in which 
event it is understood said corporation 
shall have no elairn against the second 
parties, nor any lien against said lease-
hold or any oil, gas or other hydro-
earbon substances produced on or 
fro111 the lands. 
C. Operator hereby agrees and under-
takes to provide a corporate surety 
bond in the sum of not less than Ten 
Thousand Dollars ( $10,000.00), pro-
tecting, holding harmless and indemni-
fying the second parties from all acts 
or failures to act in connection with 
first parties' operations or its con-
tracting parties under this agreement, 
which bond shall be filed with second 
parties. 
,~I. DEVELOPMENT AND DISCOVERY 
All drilling and development by the 
operator shall be conducted in a good 
and workmanlike manner, in accord-
ance with good oil field practice. All 
drilling and development charges, ex-
cept for the first well as hereinbefore 
described, shall be charged to the joint 
account of the parties hereto under the 
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9 
teru18 and eonditions described herein 
and H8 de~eribed jn the accounting 
proeedure attached hereto and 1narked 
· l~~xhibit B' and hereby 111ade a part 
hereof, on the basi8 of two per cent 
(2%) to each of the Coveys, constitut-
ing t\Yelve per cent ( 12?'o) as non-
operators and eighty-eight per cent 
(88%) to operator. 
·vii. APPR,O\TAI~ OF OPERATIONS BY 
NON-OPERATORS 
.. A.. The written approval of non-operators 
shall be required 
1. For the abandonment of any well 
which has produced oil or gas in 
coinmercial quantities for a peri-
od of thirty ( 30) days. 
2. For any capital expenditure of 
operator in any sum in excess of 
Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.-
00) for which non-operators will 
be expected to pay their share of 
the costs in cash, except that the 
\Vritten eonsent by non-operators 
of the drilling of any well shall 
be construed to mean approval of 
all necessary expenditures in drill-
ing, completing and equipping 
such well ineluding the necessary 
lease tankage. 
3. F'or the sale and disposition of 
surplus materials and equipn1ent 
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10 
by operator, it being understood 
that all equipment facilities and 
structures purchased on account 
of the joint operation of the par-
ti<~s hereto (except all such equip-
tnent, facilities and structures 
placed on or tnoved on the de-
~eri bed premises by operator for 
tlH~ drilling of the first well as 
he J'(~ i_n de~(·rihed shall be pre-
sutned to be the property of the 
owner until non-owner shall prove 
differently. Thereafter all prop-
erty purchased shall be presumed 
to be joint property until operator 
~hall prove differently.) shall be 
O\\~ned eighty - eight per cent 
(88%) by operator, twelve per 
per cent (12%) by second parties. 
B. The following specific rights, privi-
leges, and obligations of non-opera-
tors, and each of them, are hereby ex-
pressly provided, but not by way of 
li1nitation or exclusion of any other 
rights, privileges or obligations of 
the said party : 
1. Non-operators shall have access 
to the lands, subject to this agree-
ment, at all reasonable times to 
inspect and observe operations of 
every kind and character upon the 
property. 
2. Non-operators shall have access at 
all reasonable times to any and all 
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inforn1ation pertaining to wells, 
drilling, production secured and 
oil Inarketed and to the books, 
records and vouchers relating to 
the operation of the lands, sub-
ject to thi~ agree1nent. 
3. Operator shall, upon request, fur-
nish the non-operators with daily 
drilling reports, true and com-
plete copies of well logs, as soon 
as possible after the preparation 
thereof, tank tables, daily gauge 
and run tickets and reports of 
stock on hand the first of each 
rnonth; and shall also, upon re-
quest, make available samples and 
cuttings from any and all wells 
drilled in which non-operator has 
an interest on the said lands. 
\'III. DITTIES O:B~ OPERATORS 
A. Operator shall, at all tunes, keep the 
joint interests of the parties hereto in 
and to the leases and product there-
from and equip1nent free and clear 
of all labor and 1neehanic's liens and 
encumbrances. * ':~ * 
B. Non-operators shall have a lien on the 
interests of the operators in said 
leases and agreements and the oil 
and gas produced therefrom the pro-
ceeds thereof and the rnaterial and 
equiprnent thereof to secure the pay-
n1ent of operator's proportionate 
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.· .. ·;,,.,, ()l ·,·,r:ri·n;·,~4al·~,i<lfHiM)l(fJSts and expenses of de-
, :: !.·';·:t,·>' ;-. n.> J·,frfWn}n~fl-n«· 1<pperating the said lands 
... qed '>.·! (\j J):~Jfor)·H!fi.·DJl.JiP<p1l~ of keeping said prop-
•··. ·, :ll L.~·)·, :·T,d· .. 1 ~rt~,!r~~1~Jl~t~Jear of liens and encum-
. < • . .~ J , 11 1; 'I 1 ,h L'f\.ll<;'~ti. H }lPOJH t the property of non-
,j:!·, .. p.JJO!'(,ttor&,t ~~f sums recovered fron1 
tlu~ di~position 'of operator's property 
.. , ':; ,' ;; , . '·r ·: ,. · j; (Pr.:t~~<ll~YlJ.~JJt ~f: the obligations of 
...... 1. I .. ;.: H,.J .. '> ~he;~oue.rato.r<H~tall be applied first to· 
: , ·~ J} ~: ';!,·,! . (:Qfits,.l S~@i'J.rt·iJlPOn the obligations of . _ 
n•.r.:-. ~~B .·:: n1 II·~·., ~h~ pp~rAtO,J;~~Jlpd any balance rernain- --~~~\z-~· 
: ·(,; 'i ;· ·,·((, 'L~J 'J'~ng th~reAftfter:J~hall be paid to the op- ·;; 
. ··~. :·,•. ·.~J, '· ,·":'->.ti!~ra~n!· o,r,t;,;it$JSUccessors or assigns." 
,::'! , Ri~h~f\1 :p:;~u~k~~rH·Z.~ \t~t~(ied that he is an attor-
ney andipl:e,pared_,;.:\J.:·twl~~ Qfil»enrporation for the Baird 
and Robbibs 'D~·iiiing (_)btHpan~;,; .Inc. and that upon the 
in('orpb'ra~hni;, P3;lfl:JfWSffiJfii~O~f·les ceased (R. 193, 194, 
& 198). · · · i'.-·.1"··/1l
1
'_rl" '"~rr"J '-~· :: 
•••. ·-~ .., .. J. ·:. Lu J. J, dfll f. .• 
The corporation u1ade social security and unemploy-
Inen t payu1ents l t>ru~ ttsi eirtiploYte~s: fdtrltlmidrillif1g of the 
Slaug~, \\~ ~l~ (~. 1 999}).. T~e. co.rng~at1on also made with-., _ • , ~ t ~ . . I J rL . . rJ} L lf"" .. > th I H f(J .7: 
~lpi~g I ta;x JAA}~~ e1ilt1is ·, ( ,t~ J 2.~Q,)! r r i 111 i \ > [, 
'i ') Wilhlafun·J. Hi&Tris~siti~ierl <fbJhirhe Respondent that 
he'>'\"a~'!sales··~no''creditl 'truinage!f~<a!Jd was acquainted 
1
' ' i \ ('I l'.lf: r\fr~•, ·~!\fr(~! Iff• 'to 
witl1 Merton E.! BB:lt_d .. ~~~.j~~~~:~J9·)~~>s office in June or 
July, 1949 (R. 160). Mr. Baird told him he had a silent 
part~~ I( ri:P rthe) w&Jrl i<J~"Si~iP,~ ;lpij-W!MfH~m~dl H. L. R.o b bins 
.1 
and."he, aJs·o -said1there .. we:Vel othevsihr£alt Lake City that 
~~r~) ilit~rested~ ~a<r 'filianJifii> inte:rm!t in the lease and 
Well iieing ·.~riil~d.: :The''~D.)Y' Q~~~ df.1,~ihose he mentioned 
-~ I '. • • . I • I ' • - ) I ' '" J / J ) 
at:~hat ~i~e .. w:~s yove;y~~):~~t;h~ di<;l;nqt say which Covey 
it.was· (R~ .161:). MF. Harris never ~cailed Mr. c·ovey about 
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the state1nents ~fr. Baird had made and no particular 
~Ir. CoYey \Yas Inentioned ( R. 169). 
The sales inYoices in this case are n1ade out to Baird 
and Robbins Drilling Company, 16¥2 South Main Street, 
Salt Lake City, r:tah (Exhibits J. K. and P) and son1e 
of then1 are u:ade sin1ply to Baird and Robbins at the 
san1e address (Exhibits L and M). One check from the 
Baird and Robbins Drilling Co1npany, Inc., was made to 
the Resondent being a payn1ent on account (Check dated 
Jiay 1±, 1949, being No. 481, Exhibit 6) . 
.... \ppellants urge but two points on this appeal. 
Point One 
l\o evidence or law supports or justifies Finding of 
Fact No. 6 that the Drilling corporation had no independent 
existence, a disregaKI of the corporate entity being unavail-
able to Respondent. 
Point Two 
No mining .partnership existed. 
ARGUl\1ENT 
Point One 
No evidence or law supports or justifies Finding of 
Fact No. 6 that the Drilling corporation had no independent 
existence, a disregard of the corporate entity being unavail-
able to Respondent. 
This is of great in1portance because the corporation 
had no interest in the lease. It is a prerequisite to a 
ntining· partnership that there be a joint ownership in the 
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len~P or the land. Bentley v. Bros;,ard, 33 Utah 396, 94 
Pat'. 7:~(); ill eister v. 11'arrow, 190 Mont. 1, 93 Pac. 2d 753; 
l r. 8. r. Wholesale Oil Co. (C.C.A. 10) 154 Pac. 2d 745. 
I r tlH' eorporation did the drilling and purchased 
~upplit~~ frotH HPS}HHt<l(·nt tltere was no partnership with 
.AppPllants and no 1ninjng partnership. The Court avoid-
Pd this que~tion hy finding the eorporation to have no 
separa tP existence ( ~-,inding (), I-L 15). The court also 
found ( I~'inding 5, R. 1-l) that the \\"ell was drilled by M. 
I~. Baird and l I. L. Robbins doing business as Baird and 
Robbin~ Drilling Co1upany. This Finding might appear 
to follow neee:-:sarily fro111 E.,inding No. 6, disregarding 
the corporate entity. If :B..,inding No. 6 \Vas beyond the 
issue~ available to the llespondent, then the new trial 
should have been granted to determine who actually 
did the drilling- the corporation or the partnership-
without any in1pelled conclusion because the corporation 
'vas a firtion. 
There is 1nuch evidence that the corporation drilled 
the well. The Joint Operating Agreement (Exhibit C) 
authorized Baird anq Robbins to drill the well through a 
closed corporation. The Corporation had just been form-
ed on Dece1nber 31, 1948, when the Agree1nent was finally 
signed on January 5, 1949 (R. 194, 197, 198, 19·9). And 
Mr. Ruckenbrod testified that upon formation of the cor-
poration the partnership didn't function any more (R. 
197). Respondent made no determination of whom or 
what Baird and Robbins were, but sent invoices to "Baird 
and Robbins Drilling Co." and to "Baird and Robbins" 
(Exhibits K, L, M, 0, and P). 
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~xhibit~ 4 and j are checkbooks of the corporation 
showing that drilling expenses were paid with corpora-
tion checks. 1'he corporation paid incon1e \vithholding, 
~orial ~ecurity and unenlplO)i'l.nent taxes on the drilling 
operation~ (R. 209-210). The bank account at Vernal was 
in the nan1e of ·'Baird and Robbins Drilling Co., Inc." 
(Exhibit S and ~xhibits marked H Bank of Vernal" includ-
ing check~ and statements). The Continental Bank and 
Trust Cornpany account was in the nau1e of ''Baird and 
Robbins Drilling Co. (Exhibit F, G, and envelope marked 
July, 1948) but the checks used in that account were 
plainly marked '•Baird and Robbins Drilling Co., Inc." 
(Exhibits 6, 7, 5 and envelope marked July, 1949). 
There is no evidence that Respondents 1nade any in-
quiries about who was drilling the well and who would 
pay for it. Respondent simply sold supplies without credit 
investigation. There were no fraud, 1nisleading, mis-
representations, reliance or change of position. Respond-
ent now seeks to create a \Vindfall for itself by proving 
a partnership it never relied on in extending credit. 
In order to claim that the corporation was a fiction 
the person making the claim must have been misled or 
must have relied to his prejudice on representations. 
The law as to disregarding entity is discussed in Sec-
tions 7 and 8 of 13 Am. Jur. on Corporation~ as follows: 
"The doctrine that a corporation is a legal 
entity existing separate and apart fron1 the per-
sons composing it is a legal theory introduced for 
purposes of conv~nience and to subserve the ends 
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Of justice. 'ehe <~On<~ept <~annot, therefore, be ex-
tl~lldt~d to a point beyond ih; reason and policy, 
and whPu invoked in support of an end subversive 
of this poli<·y, \vill be disregarded by the courts. 
'l~hu~, iu an appropriate <'a~e and in furtherance 
of tlu~ Pnds of justi<·<~, a torporation and the in-
di\'idual or individuals owning all its stock and 
a~~Pts \\'ill lH· treated as identical, the corporate 
(~ntity being disregarded where used as a cloak 
or ('OY(•r for fraud or illegality." 
.Annotations on the question are at·l A. L. R. 610 and 
34 A. L. R. ;>97. The general rule is that the corporate 
entity will not Le di~regarded, \\'ith exceptions to this 
rule \\·here ereditors \rould be defrauded, where corpora-
tion~ are for1ued to avoid liability under contracts, or 
where individuals have attempted to shield then1selves 
through a corporation. The latter annotation at page 
602 quotes a rule for relief from Minifie v. Rowley, 187 
Cal. 481, 202 Pac. 673 : 
"Before the acts and obligations of a corpora-
tion can be legally recognized as those of a par-
ticular person, and vice versa, the following com-
bination of circu1nstances n1ust be made to ap-
pear: First, that the corporation is not only in-
fluenced and governed by that person, but that 
there is such a unity of interest and ownership that 
the individuality, or separateness, of the said per-
son and corporation has ceased; second, that the 
facts are such that an adherence to the fiction of 
the separate existence of the corporation would, 
under the particular circumstances, sanction a 
fraud or promote injustice." 
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In Surgical Supply Center r. Ind~tstrial Com.m.ission 
( lrtah 1950) :2~~~ I)nr. 2nd 593 at page 596, the Court dis-
cussed the rules as to disregarding a corporate entity 
in a ease entirely different on its facts and observed: 
.. ,,~ e recog·nize that the court~ have often 
looked through the Yeil of corporate structure in 
order to prevent fraud or injustice. Old Ben Coal 
Co. Y. l-.-niversal Coal Co., 248 ~{ich. 486, 227 N. W. 
79-!: People ex rei. Attorney General v. Michigan 
Bell Telephone Co., ~.:t-G ~fich. 198, 224 N. W. 438. 
Ho,vever, no question of fraud is involved in the 
present case, and 've find no occasion to disregard 
the corporate entities of the t'vo plaintiffs." 
.J..\.lso in Gea,ry cs. Ca.in, 79 l-.-tah 2'68, 9 l:>ac. 2nd 396, 
the Court was dealing with fraudulent conveyances to a 
corporation and the possibility of ignoripg the legal fic-
tion in order to prevent fraud, holding, however, that be-
cause the stockholders were not the persons accused of 
con1mitting fraud, and that they· did not hold the stock 
of the corporation in trust for the fraudulent person the 
corporate fiction could not be disregarded but did say: 
'"Courts of equity and courts of law as well, 
and courts which administer both law and equity 
in the sa1ne action, as do the courts of this state, 
will, to prevent fraud and accomplish justice, in 
proper cases ignore the legal fiction that a cor-
poration is a person separate and distinct from 
the person or group of persons who o'vn its stock. 
Western S-ecurities C.o. v. Spiro, 6'2 Utah 623, 221 
P. 856; D. I. Felsenthal Co. v. Northern Assur-
anre Co., 2H4 Ill. 343, 120 N.E. 268, 1 A.L.R. 602, 
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and annotation on page 610. * • * The doctrine 
si1nply 1neans that the courts, ignoring forms and 
looking to the substance of things, will regard the 
stockholders of a corporation as the owners of its 
property, or as the real parties in interest, when-
ever it is necessar~· to do so to prevent a fraud 
which rnight otherwise be perpetrated, to redress 
a wrong which might otherwise go without re-
dress, or to do justice which rnight otherwise fail. 
It cannot be applied in this case, which is an ac-
tion against the corporation and a person who 
holds but one share of its stock, so long as it ap-
pears that there are other stockholders, who are 
not parties to the action, owning all but one of the 
outstanding shares and it is not made to appear 
that they hold the same in trust for Addison Cain." 
There is no evidence that a~ter July 12, 1949, the 
date of the first sale by Respondent, there was any act 
connected with drilling except by and on behalf of the 
corporation. There is no evidence to support Finding 
No. 5 and it n1ust be assu~ed that it follo,ved, in the 
Court's reasoning, from Finding No. 6. This is a fallacy, 
because even if the corporate entity is to be disregarded 
the result would be to treat the stockholders as the re-
sponsible parties individually. Assume a joint venture 
between the corporation and Appellants and then such 
facts as require the corporate entity to be disregarded. 
Would not the result be to place the corporate obligation 
on the stockholders, without any expansion of the obli-
gations of the Appellants~ The case of Geary v. Ca.i.n 
(supra) seems apt. If there is fraud or other equitable 
basis for disregarding the corporate entity the stock-
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holders 'vill be held accountable but the rule will not 
apply where the stockholders are strangers to the fraud. 
8o here, if the corporate entity is disregarded the brunt 
of ~he burden '\>Vould fall, not on the stockholders of the 
c-orporation or on the persons responsible for creation 
of the corporation but on Appellants whose only offense 
was to deal \vith the corporation. The judgrnent of t4e 
Court allowing recovery against Appellants was based 
in part upon the finding that the corporation was a fic-
tion, which is wholly unsupported in the evidence and 
which is a position not available to Respondent against 
these Appellants. Furthermore, there is no evidence 
to support the finding that the \vell was drilled by the 
partnership, and even if there were, that evidence is so 
'veak as to indicate that the court's finding was largely 
based upon its views that the corporate entity could be 
disregarded. ..:-\ ne-\v trial should have been gran ted to 
determine, entirely apart from any tendency to disregard 
the corporate entity whether the well was actually drilled 
by the corporation or the partnership. The burden of 
proof as to this was on Respondent. 
Point Two 
No mining partnership existed. 
F·or two reasons there was no 1nining partnership, 
apart from the questions raised under Point One: 
First, there was no sharing of loses; 
Second, there \vas no joint control or operation. 
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Jt'irsl, there was no ::;haring of losses. 
J lad there been no mention of losses the law might 
iutply a sharing of lo:-;s<~s from a general operation to-
gPt her and t'rotu thP sharing of profits. Appellants ad-
utit tJtat th(l ,joint operating agreernent provided for divi-
sion of profit~, 1 ~';~ to Appellants and 88% to Baird and 
Hobbins. But this agreeH1ent was drawn to negative a 
sharing of losses and specifically accomplishes that. "The 
l ~o,·pys \vere willing to purchase interests only on cer-
tain <·ondi tions '' (It 199) and the joint operating agree-
In en t contains those provisions, as above quoted at pages 
4 to 12. 
Paragraph IA of tlte Joint Operating Agreement 
li1nits the inYe::;tinent to $16,000 plus the purchase of pipe 
(Par. ID) the $16,000 to be used for "Development of 
Well One" (Par. 1\ .. ) and "no part of any costs or ex-
penses for the drilling of said well * * * shall be charged 
or be a clairn upon the second parties." A corporation 
owned by Baird and R.obbins could drill the well "in which 
event it is understood said corporation shall have no 
claim against the second parties, nor any lien against 
said leasehold* * *" (Par. I\rB). And further: "Ope-rator 
shall, at all ti1nes, keep the joint interests of the parties 
hereto in and to the leases and product therefron1 and 
equiprnent free and clear of all labor and mechanic's liens · 
and encumbrances." (Par. VIII A). 
The cases have not, and this Court surely will not, 
impose a liability for losses on parties who have specifi-
cally contracted that the losses shall be borne by Baird 
and Robbins. No policy of .the law suggests this and no 
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c~~th:l<:t; o~, .A:ppellant.s or act of l'eliance by Respondeil~ 
sugg~ts any equity in.such~a.position. ~ ; _ , .~ .. 
Mining partnerships are g~overned generally by part-
:de~s:hi~ila:\v .,,~itlr · ~hl:ree ·es:sentiaJ di'ffer'erices·: the inter-
e·d.t~i·~re· ia~~ig·hab1e, ~;death )of a" partner 'does no't cause 
1.. \ r l i .~ ; ~~ 0 '} l , J ~ : I , • 0 a. • I ' .C.. ~ J : : • _..:. .~ ,~ ~ ' J a ' a • 
d~ssoitlrion, and anth,ority of a partner to biud the part-
.) ;, J 1,. .)A J. ' .1. ' \_ J I ... ~ ' ' ,,j I ~ " • 
~er~'i;p_.is l~luited,)to; usual. rnining()expense .. Bentley v. 
Bt:hs.s~z~~l,':3!3 ~1Jtah-396,f94:~ Par. 736,'743.1 '·Therefore as to 
ariY qtte'stion' 1 il1Yol~d_1·i:b. this c~~e! the la,\r i~ the sau1e. 
-'I9U:'dJ! l ·) o .. 1 ) "·'' .')., , ,, ·'1 t:i.·, -~ ') I) 
It i~ a require1nent of both a generai··mercantile part-
~~~tiship: a~<i~: ~qm~ng .. pn-rtne:rsbip that th~re be a sharing 
of t}<J$-Se~.l 0r; 1st a ted c.onvers'ely, (wh:e~·e ith~ agreement pre-
~llid~ r I~.; r~~dfing: ·of . fos~~·s · ho) part.n'e!·ship ari~es. Of 
~ :.. q ·: '~ • i : ! , ( ; · · '" ' : ~ r 1 r · · . '-, ' . '"} '; · .. . · ~ ' ~ j . · r • . : J ( j • 
eq~r~~·'-. . tJfr,.P~ .. r~le$'J ~ou.~d-J?r~.~ ~~~t;n~r,~}l~pr~s 1 ,~o third 
P~tYtt~~ ifl:P~ liu1it)ps~e~.r~s-j_het~q~11 ·then1~e~ves, hut here 
thete:,is ·i1o·· such iintent ~and·the~ only)que·stioi1 is ·whether 
the) agfeEHriknf e~'tahlished ~a: p~ttnershi p 1 h)~ I ii~plica.tion 
:I: t"' r., .. ,, , .. _,J 'l) .-, t\' ~· . t.·· /f t~ -.• ~ ; , 
of )a'f .. ang q~~ t.rar~y- t9: the i~te~t~,6n~. o'f; ~he p_arti~s. 
I ' r, l ~-' J ; ~ , J . ,. 4 • 
') .. f() [Tfierdgie~nre-n:t~tfiaxt ·fio~l6s8e~ ~should,.b~ ~horne by Ap-
p~l~a:~ts:~;·p.r~vi~t~<;l ~· t~~e_:iiin})licat~?n ·; ~f ·.:aq~p~rt,riership. 
Far1:ne1~:;: ~a·.)llf~chaizt~? ,.Na.tiotta~·- B~k -v. Anderson, 
.. ' ! j ..1 '\ • , , ) 1 . } , . r ' 1 
250 N. w .. 214,. 216,Jowa 988;.' f?tf.trmers!. Coop v. Farmers' 
Union~ 260'P.ac. ·7u5·, 127 Okl. 275·; 'M'cAnally 'V.' Cochran, 
170 Ol{l.. 3G8, 46(Pac.r'2d~955 ;''Ash ef.al /V'.- :Mi6kels,on, 118 
' , • ' j {' ' (. ") ( I I .• i ' ' ' ~ . i ( , : ' ( j 
Okl. l63, ~47 Pacf .,68Q;. 6,~· :q.tT.'S.r 429 .. 43q ;~58. C .. J..S. 688, 
691; 40: An1.i.Jur-.. 't53;. 131 A. L. R. 508;539; White v. 
Houston I~ umber Co:~ rl7·9 Okl. ·89~ 64 Pac/2d 908. ·; 
• . r r \ ' . . . . . ' , : , . '. . . c . 
• r 1 ·, • , • , , , ; \ • 1 · r · ~ ' l ;. ' L ~ i J , , t 
~·. ·• ] 1,armers' and Mf!<rcha~ts:,·NationalrrBank!.v. !Ander-
srH1· (supra)_ 'vas· an. action to ·enfo-rce liability_ for debts 
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of an oil develop1nent venture on the theory of partner~ 
~hip. At pag-PH 217-218 of 250 N. W. the Court held: 
u• • • that, while it is not necessary that such 
agrt ..eHu·nt Hhould he express as to all its terms, 
it iH ne<·e:.;:.;ary that it he shown that it was the 
UJulerstandiHg and intention of the parties that 
thert~ be a eOHllltUnitv of interest in capital a 
.. ' Hharing of the profits, and a rnutual liability for 
the losses; and that, in the absence of any one 
of these ele1nents, there can he no real partner-
ship. • • • 
.. It is quite true that this court has repeatedly 
stated that it is not necessary that there be an ex-
press agreen1ent e~tablishing mutual liability for 
losses, and that, where the com1nunity of interest 
in capital and division of profits is clearly shown, 
the 1nutual liability for losses \vill be _implied un-
less shown to be inconsistent 'vith the intention 
of the parties. It is equally clear that under our 
decisions an express agree1nent on the subject of 
losses will control, and that, if such agreement 
provide for nonliability for losses, this fact alone 
will negative the existence of a partnership. As 
said in '' eenstra Y. Mathews, 194 Iowa 792, 190 N. 
W. 382, 383; 'It is strenuously argued by the de-
fendant that there was no partnership because 
there was no agreement for a divsion of losses. 
It is true that there was no express agreement 
for such division. It is not essential that there 
should be, though it is essential to the existence 
of a partnership that there be a mutual liability 
for losses. In the absence of express agreement 
on the subject of losses, the mutual liability for 
losses will be implied where the fact of partner-
ship is established by other evidence. Of course, 
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if there be an expre~~ agreeu1ent on the subject 
of losses, such agreen1ent \Yill eontrol. If such ex-
press agree1uent negatiYe the sharing of losses, 
it negatiYes the partnership.' * * * 
~~ \Yhere a n1an has contributed his 1noney to 
and taken the risk of losing it in an enterprise, 
\Yith the distinet understanding and agreement 
that he shall not be liable for any greater amount 
than the n1oney thus contributed, "\Ve are unable 
to see the justice or reasonableness of a doctrine 
"?hieh says that he n1ust nevertheless be held liable 
to one \Vho has dealt with such enterprise, with 
full kno,v1edge of the tern1s of the agree1nent that 
the n1an who contributed his Inoney to such enter-
prise shall not be liable for any of the debts there-
of." 
.A._nd in our ease, where there was no knowledge in Re-
spondent about a possible partnership, Respondent is in 
no better position than if it had known all about the 
agreement. 68 C. J. S. Partnerships, pp. 429-430 thus 
states the rule: 
~'Accordingly, as a general rule, the absence 
of a liability to bear the losses or expense of a 
business ordinarily indicates that no partner-
ship was intended or exists, and it has been held 
that, where the effect of an agreernent between 
two or rnore persons in relation to the prosecution 
of an enterprise provides that, although all are to 
share in the profits one of their number shall in-
c-qr no risk and be chargeable \Vith no loss, the 
agreen1ent is not one of partnership.'' 
Second, there wa.s no ,joint control or operation. 
The Joint Operating Agreen1ent (Exhibit C) pro-
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vidE·d thut B<)pPrator" (Baird and Robbins or their cor-
1 )orat iou) Hhould <·arry on the drilling operation. This 
agTPetuent g-ave "Operator" the "sole right of prospect-
ing and PX ploring tl1e landH" subject to the agreernent 
(Par. Ill A) ; gave "()perator" the sole right and discre-
tion to hire and (•ontrol (~n1ployees "and such employees 
shall IH~ tlu~ (•tuployees of tlH~ operator and under its 
sole di reetion and orders'' (Par. IIIB) ; and all Appel-
lants had \ven~ the rights of inspection and infor1nation 
(Par. ,~ .. liB). This lack of joint operation prevented 
i1nplication of a partnership or the arising of a part-
nership including Appellants as members. 
J.~JcAnally 1/. Cochran (supra); U. S. v. Wholesale 
Oil Co. (C. C. A. 10), 154 Fed. 2d 745; Johatnson Brother$ 
Builders v. Board of Revieu:, Industrial Comm.ission 
(l ... tah 1950) 222 Pac. 2d 563, 567; Bentley v. Brossard 
(supra); 131 A. L. R. 508, 540, 541; 68 C. J. S. 425-426; 
58 C. J. S. 688; 4 Summers, Oil and Gas, Sees. 723, 724. 
The requisites of a 1nining partnership are thus stated in 
58 c. J. s. 688 : 
"With respect to the elements of the relation 
of a mining partnership, each case must neces-
sarily be determined by it own facts. However, 
there are three basic require1nents which 1nust al-
ways be present for the creation and existence of 
the relationship, and they are co-ownership, joint 
operation, and an agreement to share in profits 
and losses. It has been also held that, in addition 
to the above, cornmunity of interest and mutual 
agency are also necessary. * * *" 
I II 
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Thi~ treatise goes on to eonsider these three ele-
tnent~ in greater detail, ~tating that joint ovvnership is 
not sufficient to n1ake a Inining partnership, nor is mu-
tual agency, and as to the requisite of joint operation, 
1nake~ thi~ ~tate1nent at page 690: 
··Joint operation. .L\.n Agree1nent for coop-
eration and the joint \vorking of a n1ine is essen-
tial to the creation of a rnining partnership; and 
in some jurisdictions an actual joint operation or 
develop1nent is essential. As a general rule a min-
ing partnership arises when two or more co-
o,vners or lessees of a 1nining claim actually en-
gage in working it and share according to the in-
terest of each, although there is no express agree-
Inent bet,veen them to becon1e partners; but 1nere 
joint operations of a Inine or well will not neces-
sarily create a partnership.'' · 
The same question was discussed in McAnally t:. 
Cochran (supra) \vhere an agreernent was rnade to use 
well-drilling tools and in consideration thereof to assign 
an interest in the lease, the borrowers of the tools under-
taking the actual drilling and doing the hiring and pay-
ing of e1nployees. The court held that operation of a 
1nining lease by co-tenants did not establish a Inining 
partnership and quoted the following language from 
Gillespie v. Sht~tf/lin, 91 Okl. 72, 216 Pac. 132 at page 956 
of 46 Pac. 2d : 
"In order to constitute a mining partnership, 
the parties must cooperate in developing a lease 
for oil and gas, each agreeing to pay his part of 
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the expenses and to share in the profits or losses. 
:tic • • 
"Inter s·ese, there must be an intention of the 
· partners to do so, in order to create a partnership 
and such intention cannot be inferred, alone, fro1n 
a joint venture in drilling a well." 
The Court then quoted fro1n the earlier case of Ash et al 
v. Mickelson, 118 Okl. 163, 247 Pac. 680: 
. "A 1nining partnership or joint adventure 
cannot exist, unless there is a cooperation among 
the parties in the developn1ent of a lease for oil 
II 
i I 
and gas, each agreeing to pay his part of the ex- l : 
penses and to share in the profits and losses. * * ·:.: 
"The mere holding of an interest in an oil and 
gas lease and leasehold estate with other co-ten-
ants and having knowledge that a well 'vas being 
drilled thereon by one or more of the co-tenants 
does not constitute 'cooperation' as conten1plated 
by the authorities herein cited." * «= * 
''There is no evidence in the record that shows 
or tends to show that the owners of the leasehold 
estate ever conte1nplated a partnership among the 
various owners of the lease at the time they pur-
chased an interest in the same, some of which were 
before the well was ever begun. Neither does 
the evidence show or tend to show that there was 
any such agreen1ent between the parties during 
the progress of the drilling of the well, nor as to 
the operation and management of the well after 
production was found. The parties never came to-
gether for the purpose of perfecting such an ar-
rangement. J. R. Root and F·. S. Hoxie had ex-
clusive control during the drilling of the well and 
with no authority to act for any other co-tenant, 
and the same is true after they had reached the 
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Skinner sand and had decided to n1ake a well 
therein. It is not shown that any of the other 
parties of interest was ever consulted about em-
ploying labor for cleaning the well or doing any 
of the other many things necessary to be done at 
a ne'v w·ell, or in purchasing tankage or other 
equipment necessary therefor. Neither does the 
testin1ony sho\\· that the parties in charge had 
any authority to act for others." 
In United States v. Wholesale O,il Com,pany (supra) 
the question \Vas to determine whether a partnership 
existed in the operation of retail gasoline filling stations 
or 'vhether the relation 'vas that of en1ployer and ein-
ployee. The station n1anagers had a monthly drawing 
account which was charged against one half of the profits, 
the business could not be sold without the approval of the 
co1npany and when an operator quit the business there 
was an accounting of profits between the1n and no dis-
tribution of assets. In holding that there was no part-
nership the Court stated at page 748: 
"Neither did the operator have the right to ex~ 
ercise his independent judgment in the manage-
Inent and operation of his business. * * * The busi-
ness was conducted in the name of the company; 
the bank account \vas kept in the naine of the com-
pany in a bank designated by it; the checks were 
written against the account only by the company 
and none were written against this account by 
the operator save that in an einergency he might 
dra'v a check against the account. * * * Neither 
did he assume any liability for the debts of the so-
railed partnership or joint adventure. He did not 
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become liabl<' for merchandise accounts or for 
other ohligations incurred by the company." 
A~ a te~t of joint operation~ this language is close 
to thP a<·tivitie~ of the partie~ here. The Baird and Rob-
bin~ ( iotupuny tHad(l all d<~eisions concerning the drilling 
of th(• \\'<ll1, <·ontrolled all of the funds in bank accounts 
to \\'hi<~h 1\ppellantH \\·erp strangers, purchased all sup-
plies, <jluployed all labor(~rs and supervisory ~mployees, 
and never at any titne consulted with Appellants or any-
one t.llse eoncerning decisions to be 1nade in the drilling 
of the well. It see1us obvious that if Appellants had at-
teinpted to interfere in any \vay 'vith drilling of this 'vell 
as a partner ,,·ould have a right to do, Baird and Robbins 
would have pointed to the joint operating agreement 
and advised Appellants to ~tay out of the drilling oper-
ation. To suppose that Appellants could have made pur-
chases for the drilling of this well and bound Baird and 
Robbins thereby would be to stretch this operating 
agreen1ent beyond any reasonable interpretation-and 
yet, if a n1ining partnership were intended between par-. 
ties such activities would have been reasonable. The in-
tention of the parties as expressed in the operating agree-
ment negatives any possible intended joint operation. 
In Johanson Brothers Builders v. Boa.rd of R:eview 
(supra) the Industrial Commission determined that no 
partnership existed under a plan whereby a brick mason 
agreed with other brick masons that they would work 
together on various jobs all of which would be obtained 
by Carl Johanson each of them to share in the profits 
I I 
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according to a forn1ula. This Court pointed out that 
under the l'""tah Statute a partnership is Han association 
of two or 1nore per~ on~ to ea rry on as eo-partners ,of a 
business for profif. and also that Hall partners have 
equal right8 in the n1anagen1ent and eonduet of the part-
nership business.·' The Court held that no partnership 
\ras e~tablished because, as further pointed out at page 
567, the bank account \vas carried in the narne of Carl 
F. Johanson and \vife and no one else had a right to draw 
on it: Johanson rningled contracting business funds with 
other ineo1ne; all the equipment belonged to Johanson 
and there \vas no acquisition of an interest in such assets 
by the other interested parties; and only Carl Johanson 
could have contracted for any job. The practical tests 
applied to that -case could be equally applied to this case. 
Baird and Robbins owned trucks, and presumably some 
other equipment (see Exhibits C, Par. I\T B), leased 
equipment, rnade all decisions concerning operations, 
banked the money in their account, mingling it with other 
funds in both the Continental and Bank of Vernal ac-
counts and consulted with Appellants in no particular. 
The question of rnining partnership was carefully 
considered by this court in Bentley v. Brossard (supra) 
in 1908. In that case one Fannof owned a mine and en-
tered into a lease with one Brossard for development of 
the mine in equal interests, with the proviso that Fannof 
should not be held for any of the expenses or losses. 
The lease required Brossard to work and develop the 
claiins in a proper manner, to employ a specified number 
of 1nen, to sell the ore and divide the proceeds in an 
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ngTPPd HtannP r. Fannof could be e1nployed if the opera-
tiull wa~ with HtPatn. I~rossard al~o had the right to pur-
('ha~tl an inten~~t in U1P property at a given price. Bros-
:--;anl tlu·n PntPrPd into agreetnent with other people who 
\\'PJ'P lltadP <h_.I'PtHlants with hiln in the case, these people 
H~n·Ping tu advarw<~ t·<·rtain sums of n1oney "for develop-
HtPnt (Jr ~aid utining <·Jaiuts and the tarrying out of" the 
l·'annuf <'Oll tr£u·t. Proceeds aceruing to Brossard were 
to },p :--;hared \\' i th the people he interested. Brossard 
had <!harg<~ of the \r()rk and supervised it although there 
\\·as evidence that the other contributors joined in the 
operation and partiti pated in the decisions. Action was 
brought by a laborer against Brossard and those inter-
ested ,,·ith hitn, and although Fannof testified at the trial 
he was not Inade a party defendant. 
The trial court sub1nitted the case to the jury on the 
question of the n1ining partnership and the Supreme 
Court held that the contracts and the evidence consti-
tuted a Iuining partnership as a matter of law. Although 
Fannof appears to be in the position that the Appellants 
are in here, he was not 1nade a party in that action. The 
Court held that the contract itself created the relation-
ship of partnership quoting a- decision that the re-quisites 
of joining together for the co1nmon benefit, each contri-
buting property or services,- and having a con1n1unity 
of interests in the profits was sufficient. (page 407 of 33 
Utah). The Court discussed the requirements of sharing 
losses and further that the agreement to share profits 
with nothing said about losses was prima facie an agree-
ment to share loses which is also necessary to a partner-
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ship (page -!08). ...\t the botton1 of the sa1ne page the court 
relies heaYily upon the contract between Brossard and 
Fannof "'hieh \\'"as the induce1nen t of the subleases, and it 
was this eontract 'vhich eon11nitted the sublessees to the 
progrrun of \\'"Orking and developing the rnines in accord-
ance 'vith the lease. It \vas impossible for the1n to under-
take to perforn1 the :B,annof contract without associating 
themselves together within the contemplation of that 
con tract. (page 409). The court also discussed the dis-
tinctions between a n1ining partnership and an ordinary 
con1mereial partnership. None of these distinctions is 
significant in the Bentley case or in the case at bar and 
there is no rule that a ruining partnership is more easily 
forrned or is formed against the plainly expressed in-
tention of the parties any 1nore than is a com1nercial or 
trading partnership. vVe still have to read the contract 
and determine its intent. The Court explained the fact of 
Brossard's doing the work on the theory that he was 
rnade the general Inanager by the partners, and it was 
proper for a general n1anager to take control of the op-
erations. 
S.pecifically the differences between that case and the 
ease at bar are that the contributors in the Bentley case 
were necessarily committed to the contract requiring de-
veloprnent of the mine and nothing in the sublease nega-
tived the in1plications of full responsibility for carrying 
out that contract. In our case there is no obligation of 
develop1nent outside the Joint Operating Agreement. 
This agreement specifically negatives the joint responsi-
hilitv for n1utual operation as to this well. 
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Appellants wer(~ investors in oil and gas leases. They 
wanted to be HUre a well was drilled on the property in 
whieh they were acquiring an interest. This is a common 
pra(·tice and a nor1nal approach which an investor would 
take in conne<·tion with purchase of an undivided interest 
iu au oil w(~ll. rrll(~ gro,vth of oil exploration in Utah gives 
thi:-: <·a:-:(· 111ore Hignificanee than it would have had ten 
year~ ago. It is not ordinarily the intention of investors 
to becotue }Jartners with well drillers, nor is it the ex-
pe('tation of HUppliers to hold interest holders responsible 
for u1aterials furnished to well drillers. 
In arcordan('~ \\·ith the intention of the parties and 
the agreetuent 'v hich was carefully prepared to guard 
again~t this very liability, this court should hold that no 
1nining partnership arose under the joint operating 
agreement. 
s·UMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Joint Operating Agreement between the parties 
guards against sharing of losses by Appellants which is 
significant in detern1ining whether a partnership was in-
tended to arise. The lack of practicable control over the 
<;lrilling operation is further evidence that the incidents 
of a partnership did not exist and that no partnership 
was intended. To argue otherwise is._to contend that the 
essentials incidental to a partnership which was carefully 
excluded by the agreement will now be· made a part of 
the agreement by force of law. This would not only ig-
nore the intention of the parties but destroy .their power 
to contract. There has been no holding out of partner-
I I I 
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ship, no representation of any kind and no relianep by 
Respondent on the exi8tence of a partnership or on the· 
~redit of ~\.ppellants. There is no reason to disregard 
the corporate entity and the Court should hold the find-
ing as to that erroneous and prejudicial and, either grant 
a new trial, or direct that the judginent be vacated and 
judgn1ent of no cause of action entered. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD·S AND: BIRD AND 
DAN S. BUSHNELL, 
Attorneys for App-ellants 
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